and a specific type of consequence that might flow from variations in dependence on government (amount of political activity).
Many nonprofit organizations depend on government funding, and this financial dependence on public money has increased in recent decades as more government funded services are delivered via grants and contracts with nongovernmental organizations.1 In 1997, government funding accounted for 37 percent of the nonprofit sector's revenue, up from 31 percent in 1977 (Salamon 2002 ). The extent of this financial dependence on government varies considerably across types of nonprofit organizations, but few types receive no government funding. Even among religious congregations, 3 percent receive government money in support of social service activity (Chaves 1999 Reid 1999) . They have provided a vehicle, at least somewhat distinct from corporations, government, and political parties, through which individuals voice concerns and attempt to exert collective influence on political processes. Nonprofit advocacy takes many forms, including litigating, lobbying, researching, publishing, testifying, and organizing collective actions. Political activity is the primary purpose of some nonprofit organizations, such as the National Rifle Association or the National Organization for Women. But many other nonprofit organizations, whose primary purpose is something other than political advocacy (e.g., social service agencies or religious congregations), also engage in political activity on occasion. We focus here on the latter type of organization: nonprofits whose primary purpose is something other than political activity.2 Substantial government support of nonprofit organizations raises important questions about the consequences of this support for nonprofits' political activity. Are government funding and political activity competing or complementary features of nonprofit organizations? Do government-supported nonprofits engage in politics as actively as those nonprofit organizations that do not receive government support? Most broadly, does the current trajectory of welfare-state development toward contracting out services rather than providing them directly threaten to undermine historically important forms of nonprofit-based political activity in American society? Understanding the nature of American civil society, especially in the context of substantial contracting out of government functions and ongoing concern about declining civic engagement and political participation, requires answering these questions about the consequences of financial dependence on government for political activity in the nonprofit sector.
This issue has been particularly visible in debates over the current Bush Administration's "faith-based" or "charitable choice" initiatives aimed at redirecting public funds to further support congregations' and other religious organizations' social service activities. Some critics of these initiatives have expressed concern that increased availability of public funds for religious organizations' social service activity will dampen religious organizations' "prophetic voice" by increasing their financial dependence on government (e.g., Wallis 2001 ). This concern is a special case of the more general concern expressed by Salamon (1995) that government funding might threaten nonprofit organizations with a "loss of autonomy or inde-1 In this paper, "nonprofit organization" refers to the "religious, educational, charitable, scientific, and literary" organizations encompassed by category 501(c)(3) of the United States tax code and therefore eligible to receive tax deductible contributions. Conceptually, religious congregations are "nonprofit" because they are eligible for tax deductible contributions, even if they are not officially registered as 501(c)(3) organizations with the Internal Revenue Service. Approximately three quarters of congregations have formal 501(c)(3) status, either through their denominations or on their own.
2 In terms of Internal Revenue Service categories, our focus is on 501 (c)(3) nonprofit organizations, not on 501(c)(4) nonprofit organizations. The latter are tax exempt, but contributions to them are not tax deductible, and nonpartisan political activity may be the organization's exclusive activity. pendence, particularly [with] dilution of the sector's advocacy role" (p. 103). Our investigation of government funding's effect on nonprofit political activity is motivated, on the one hand, by general theoretical interest in the interplay between the nonprofit sector's advocacy role and its deep entanglement with government and, on the other hand, by a specific policy debate about the consequences for religious organizations' political activities of potentially increased access to government funding. Our results speak both to this specific debate and to deeper and more longstanding theoretical issues concerning the consequences for civil society of more or less autonomy from the state.
Despite its theoretical and policy importance, little systematic research has focused on the relationship between government funding and nonprofit political activity. This connection has been explored directly only through case studies (e.g., Monsma 1996) .4 Claims of any sort about the relationship between government funding and nonprofit political activity currently rest on a very thin empirical base. We examine the relationship between government funding and nonprofit political activity by measuring the key variables in two organizational samples, each of which represents the full size range of the relevant population (not just the biggest organizations), and each of which enables us to assess this relationship in the presence of relevant statistical controls. One of these samples is a panel study, which allows us to introduce a longitudinal dimension in our analysis.
We begin by drawing on existing theory and research to build a simple theoretical model of the relationship between government funding and levels of nonprofit political activity. Although the existing literature helps us to identify plausible mechanisms by which government funding might affect nonprofit political activity, it does not yield an unambiguous answer to a basic question about the direction of that relationship: Does government funding suppress, enhance, or have no effect on nonprofits' political activity? We address this question with a nationally representative sample of religious congregations and a longitudinal representative sample of nonprofit organizations in Minneapolis-St. Paul. We obtain strikingly consistent results.
BACKGROUND AND THEORY
Investigating the relationship between government funding and nonprofit political activity is complicated by variation in the goals nonprofit organizations pursue through political activity, the tactics they employ in pursuit of those goals, and the types of nonprofit organization engaging in political activity. Nonprofit organizations might use letter-writing and telephone campaigns directed at legislators to advocate on behalf of an interest group; they might testify at legislative hearings or mobilize individuals to demonstrate at a state capitol to influence policy on behalf of a client population that they serve; they might promote a particular mission by supporting or resisting particular policies or legislative agendas; they might engage in nonpartisan public education around political issues; they might endorse political candidates; or they might sponsor demonstrations and marches. Although this is not an exhaustive list of the political activities in which nonprofits might 3 Only 42 percent of all organizations registered with the IRS as 501(c)(3) nonprofits submit financial returns. In Indiana, the only state for which relevant comparisons have been made, the nonprofits submitting financial returns constitute only 10 percent of the total nonprofit population (Gronbjerg 2002:1747, 1772). Nonprofit organizations with less than $5,000 in annual revenue are not required to register with the IRS; organizations with less than $25,000 in annual revenue are not required to submit a financial return (Form 990). Religious congregations are not required to register or submit financial returns whatever their size.
4 The initial wave of this research (e.g., Fish 1973; Gittell 1980; Helfgot 1974 ) examined the dilemmas of political activity faced by 1960s' community organizations that received public funds. engage, it illustrates the range of goals, tactics, and organizational types encompassed by nonprofit political activity. We might expect government funding to have different consequences across types of nonprofit organizations, political goals, and tactics.
We focus on nonprofit organizations whose primary purpose is something other than political activity or advocacy, but this restriction still leaves substantial variation in organizational types and in political goals and tactics. We are not able to comprehensively study the effects of government funding on every type of political activity across every type of nonprofit organization. We are, however, able to measure a range of political activities among a variety of types of nonprofit organization. Since distinguishing among different types of political activities and different types ofnonprofits does not, within the limits of our data and measures, produce importantly different results, we will, in this section, use an undifferentiated concept of "political activity" and an undifferentiated category of "nonprofit organization" rather than distinguish specific types of political activity and specific sorts of organizations.
How GOVERNMENT FUNDING MIGHT
SUPPRESS NONPROFIT POLTICAL ACnIvITY RESOURCE DEPENDENCE. The most obvious and direct mechanism by which government funding might suppress nonprofits' political activity is straightforward, don't-bite-the-handthat-feeds-you resource dependence. That is, nonprofits that depend on government for part of their livelihood might refrain from oppositional political activity or advocacy not welcomed by that funding source. As Wolch (1990) put it: "As public funding becomes more central to organizational survival, these groups may be essentially co-opted and become quiescent" (p. 215). This clearly happens in some times and places. Harris (2001) Instances of outright punishment (or threat of punishment) by government funders for political activity may be rare, but that rarity does not prevent nonprofit executives from worrying about the potential negative consequences of political activity. Nonprofit leaders sometimes express both anxiety over the loss of autonomy they fear will come with government money and fear that their political activity will drive away government funders (Monsma 1996; Netting 1982; Reid 1999:301-2). One case study described an organization that eventually split into two separate organizations-one for political advocacy and the other to receive government funding-because of perceived "tensions between [the organization's] history of advocacy and its role as a government contractor" (Stone 1996:79) . The organization wanted to continue its political work, but it "was obviously reluctant to bite the hand that fed them, as one interviewee reported" (p. 79). And a recently produced pamphlet intended to help religious organizations assess whether they should pursue government funds in support of social service activity simply asserts without comment that one of the down sides of doing so is that government money "undermines the traditional role of religion as prophetic critic of government; like every other government-subsidized group, religion will be less likely to bite the hand that feeds it" (Keeping the Faith, n.d.:4). There are many such examples (also, Berry 2003:74,106; Hudson 2002:412). They show that at least some nonprofit leaders fear that confrontational political activity will endanger their government funding. In the presence of this assumption, government funding will suppress at least some types of nonprofit political activity, and that suppression will occur even if the assumption is unjustified because actual instances of retribution in response to political activity are rare.
Resource dependence also operates more subtly than via punishment or fear of punishment for unwelcome political activity. Government funding causes several sorts of changes in nonprofit organizational structure and behavior; it shifts board composition and increases complexity, formalization, professionalization, and bureaucratization (Froelich 1999; Gronbjerg 1993; Kramer 1981; Smith and Lipsky 1993; Stone 1996) . These changes occur as organizations reorient themselves toward their government funders, acquiring or creating the technical expertise and administrative infrastructure necessary to secure, manage, and sustain that funding. Similarly, the case study literature contains examples of nonprofit organizations reducing their political activity because they redirect organizational attention and energy away from advocacy and toward activities necessary to sustain the government funding on which they depend. A qualitative study ofnonprofits in Cuyahoga County, Ohio, for example, found that increased government funding led nonprofits to redirect attention, energy, and resources away from service delivery and advocacy and toward administrative activities such as grant-writing, fundraising, and documenting the community's need for services. In this way, increased nonprofit reliance on government funding "was changing the nature of their services; it had substantially diminished their capacity to be political" (Alexander, Nank, and Stivers 1999:460). A qualitative study of rape crisis centers and battered women's shelters, to give another example, found that government funding professionalized these organizations and, in the process, "undermined the distinctively private and ideological character of these programs," changing them from agencies that "openly challenged the established political and professional order" to organizations with "more educated, more experienced staff, more client equity, and greater standardization of services" (Smith 1989:227 ; also see Matthews 1994) . These examples illustrate how the formalization and professionalization that accompany government funding can move nonprofit organizations away from political advocacy.
A resource dependence perspective thus suggests at least two paths by which government funding might reduce nonprofits' political activity: via fear of punishment for unwelcome political activity, and via redirecting organizational attention, energy, and resources away from political activity and toward administrative activities made necessary by government funding. This latter mechanism can be understood as a type of coercive isomorphism by which resource dependence, rather than law, pressures organizations to act in a certain way. Unlike the don'tbite-the-hand-that-feeds-you mechanism, this latter mechanism also implies that government funding would reduce political activity of all sorts, not just activity that challenges the funder. COMPLEX Community Action Projects, which "found that federal support was restricted to particular services and imposed strict fiscal controls that frequently collided with advocacy and indigenous mobilization efforts" (p. 304). But beyond the directly coercive effect of anti-advocacy rules attached to government funding streams, the complexities and uncertainties inherent in the legal environment governing the political activity of nonprofit organizations may decrease in a more subtle way the political activity of government-funded nonprofit organizations contemplating political activity. It is rare for a nonprofit organization to face legal sanction because of its political activity, but, as with beliefs that political activity might threaten government funding via retribution, it is common for nonprofit executives and board members to believe that accepting government funding legally restricts their political activity more than it actually does.
The widespread worry among nonprofit leaders about the legality of a publicly funded organization engaging in political activity is evident in surveys of nonprofit executives, in case studies, and in the literature and discourse produced by and for nonprofits. A 2000 survey of executives in nonprofits that filed financial returns with the IRS found that two-thirds (68 percent) wrongly believed that their organizations were not allowed to lobby if part of their funding came from the government (Berry 2003 Nonprofits. This report, explicitly aimed at community groups attracted to political activity but "worried that speaking out will . . . endanger your government contracts or nonprofit status," asserts: "Many agencies that use government money to provide services are concerned that speaking up will endanger their legal status or put philanthropic and government funding in jeopardy" (Duitch n.d.:2-3). Furthermore, some nonprofits that intend to engage in politics decline to accept government funds because they believe the funds will threaten their advocacy. This is illustrated by the founder of a child-advocacy group in Ohio who noted that his organization "won't accept government funds This example nicely illustrates both aspects of the causal path produced by legal complexity. On the one hand, public funding carries with it some real legal restrictions on an organization's political activity. On the other hand, there is widespread misunderstanding about just what those restrictions are, and that misunderstanding, especially when exploited by interested actors, induces political caution by nonprofits. The above exchange clearly assumes that Head Start providers' beliefs about the legal rules attached to their federal funding directly affect their political activity, and it assumes further that many providers believe that they would be wise to refrain from such activity. The associate commissioner is trying to reinforce that belief; the NHSA president is trying to counter it.
Many examples exist, but these few suffice to establish the dual point that government-supported organizations are in a more restrictive legal environment than are other nonprofits when it comes to political activity, and, more importantly, the legal complexities and uncertainties in this arena sometimes cause leaders of publicly funded nonprofits to believe that the legal environment is more restrictive than it really is (also see Reid 1999:301). The consequence is enhanced caution about political activity in the presence of government funding. This causal pathway rests on what nonprofit leaders (who weigh the costs and benefits of organizational political action) believe about the potential negative consequences of such action for their organizations, and it will operate even if those beliefs are unfounded and alarmist.7
How GOVERNMENT FUNDING MIGHT ENHANCE NONPROFIT POLITICAL Acrivrry Kramer (1987) identified several features of government-nonprofit relations that might be expected to mitigate the suppressing effect of government funding on nonprofit political activity. These include: "the payment-for-service form of most transactions, which involves less control than grants or subsidies; the diversity of voluntary agency income sources, which lessens dependency on any one; the countervailing power of a voluntary agency oligopsony (few sellers) of a service required by a government agency for its clients; political influence of the voluntary agency; and the lack of incentives and capacity for stricter accountability by government" (p. 247). Some of these circumstances, and others not part of this list, might go beyond merely mitigating the potential negative effects of government funding on political activity to set in motion causal chains by which government funding actually enhances nonprofit political activity. We focus on two such mechanisms. do not necessarily react passively to their resource environments; they attempt to shape and control those environments. When a government funder is an important part of that environment, we might therefore expect political activity to increase (Galaskiewicz 1985:292) .8
The case study literature documents that this incentive operates at least in some times and places. In their study of several dozen San Francisco nonprofits, Kramer and Grossman (1987) observed that it was "exceedingly difficult [for government] not to renew a contract if the provider ... can mobilize community support" (p. 43). Mobilizing "hundreds of elderly or disabled clients to pack a legislative chamber" helped these nonprofits press for additional government funds and more favorable payment systems (Kramer and Grossman 1987:46). Smith (1999) described a politically active social service organization that receives 70 percent of its budget from government and whose "legislative priorities focus on obtaining rate increases for its programs" (p. 196). Nowland-Foreman (1998) studied a nonprofit organization whose government support "did not stop [it from] taking part (and sometimes taking a lead) in lobbying the government, not just or even mainly for its own grants but also about legislation that affected the people it served" (pp. 108-9). Fish (1973) examined a Chicago community organization that engaged intensively in various kinds of political action to obtain and protect its federal funding. Even if a nonprofit organization's government funding is straightforward political patronage, involvement in patronage networks might discourage political activity critical of the patron at the same time as it encourages political activity-voter registration drives, candidate rallies, and so on-in support of the patron's political machine (Harris 2001 Resource dependency between government and nonprofits can be a two-way street. Even if a nonprofit is dependent on government for its funding, government agencies may also depend on that organization to deliver needed services. Government agencies responsible for managing grants and contracts need qualified and capable nongovernmental partners with which to contract. If the number of such partners is limited in a given community or in a given arena, the situation is one of mutual dependence between government and the nonprofit organization(s) that can deliver the service. In a study that quantified the extent of perceived resource dependence between nonprofit organizations and the state of New York, Saidel (1991) found that "public-sector agencies and nonprofit sector organizations reported virtually identical [levels of] resource dependence on each other" (p. 546). In case studies of nonprofit contracting in San Francisco, Kramer and Grossman (1987) found that "more often than not, government is confronted ... by a market condition in which there are relatively few sellers of social services that government is mandated to supply" (p. 36). In situations of mutual dependence, both government and nonprofits control resources valuable to the other, neither can dominate the other, and government agencies and nonprofit organizations approach each other on more equal terms. Government agencies are less likely to punish unwelcome political activity by terminating contracts, and, moreover, government supported nonprofits have an incentive to engage in political activity that other nonprofits lack. When government is dependent on its nonprofit contractees, government-funded organizations will be more effective than they otherwise might be at using political activity to promote themselves, their clients, or their mission.
8 Another version of this argument could be developed by adapting Mueller's (1979:156) account of the "budget-maximizing bureaucrat" who faces many incentives to seek government money beyond what is needed to provide services. If additional public money is available, this budget-maximizing bureaucrat will devote resources (that is, the organization will engage in lobbying and other political activity) in an effort to secure it. Mueller developed this concept with respect to government bureaucrats seeking money for their agencies from legislatures, but it seems applicable to nonprofit executives as well.
SUMMARY
We surely have not identified every mechanism by which government funding might increase or decrease nonprofit political activity.9 The mechanisms we have identified, however, ought to be sufficient to conclude that, even as government funding sets in motion processes likely to decrease nonprofits' political activities, it also sets in motion processes likely to increase such activities. Which set of processes outweighs the other, in the aggregate, forms the empirical question we address. Figure I summarizes the mechanisms discussed above. Government funding sets two competing causal paths in motion. One, the path through arrows a and b in Figure 1 , will tend to decrease nonprofit political activity; the other path, through arrows c and d in Figure 1 , will tend to increase nonprofit political activity. Theory and research about nonprofit organizations imply that both of these paths are operative, but no extant research establishes the relative strength of these paths. We do not have adequate measures of relevant intervening variables, so we cannot assess the relative importance of the specific mechanisms associated with each path, nor can we estimate the magnitude of the effects associated with arrows a through d. We have drawn a black box around this part of the diagram to indicate that we are unable to investigate its inner workings.
We are able, however, to observe covariation between the government funding going into this box and the nonprofit political activity coming out of the box, and so we can assess whether the path by which government funding suppresses nonprofit political activity is stronger, weaker, or balanced by the path by which government funding enhances nonprofit political activity. In terms of Figure 1 , our empirical task is to determine whether the sign attached to arrow e is negative, positive, or null.
Assessing the total effect of government funding on the likelihood of engaging in political activity is complicated, of course, by prior variables that might produce a spurious correlation between government funding and political activity. The most important prior variable, represented at the bottom of Figure 1 , is the underlying inclination of an organization to engage civil society, political processes, and the state. This sort of inclination could lead organizations both to seek government funds and to engage in more political activity, and it could produce a positive correlation between these two organizational behaviors, even when there is no causal connection between them. It also could produce a null correlation, even if the true causal effect is negative.
Our analyses address this concern in three ways. First, and most directly, in each data set we construct a community involvement scale intended to proxy an organization's underlying tendency to engage with civil society, political processes, and the state, and we include that variable as a control in all analyses. This is a strong control in regressions of political activity on government funding, and including it increases our confidence that any observed positive or null effects of government funding on political activity are not spuriously produced by prior variables operating in a situation where the true causal effect is negative. Second, we know a fair amount about which types of nonprofit organization are more or less likely to manifest a tendency toward community involvement, and we draw on that knowledge to introduce additional relevant control variables. Third, we exploit the longitudinal nature of the Minneapolis-St. Paul data by controlling for political activity at time 1, thereby investigating whether receiving government funds at time 1 predicts change in political activity at time 2. These longitudinal data also enable us to address the question of causal order.
Another sort of selectivity process might push the correlation between government fund-9 One additional mechanism by which government funding might enhance nonprofit political activity is direct government funding of activism. This mechanism does not seem important in the 1980s and 1990s, when our data were collected, but we mention it here because of its historical importance. Several War on Poverty federal programs of the 1960s, such as the Community Action Program and the Legal Services Program, set out to directly fund community organizing and advocacy efforts in poor neighborhoods (Haveman 1977) . In recent decades, the federal government has been more concerned about limiting nonprofit political activity than facilitating it, though in the 1990s, "rights-oriented advocacy groups" large enough to report their activity to the IRS still received, on average, 26 percent of their revenue from government (Boris and Mosher-Williams 1998:496). Since government funds are more likely to directly support services than to encourage advocacy, government-supported nonprofits might be less politically engaged simply because politically inactive organizations self-select into government funding streams-not because government funding sets in motion any of the causal paths we describe above. We are less concerned with this sort of self-selection. If we have misspecified our models by omitting variables that measure an organization's prior tendency to both seek government funds and refrain from political activity, then our government funding coefficients would be biased downward and the effects of government funding would be more positive than we observe. This possibility does not threaten our substantive conclusions. We analyze the relationship between government funding and nonprofit political activity in two distinct data sets: a national sample of congregations and a longitudinal sample of Minneapolis-St. Paul nonprofits in several sectors. These data concern very different organizational populations, and they measure political activity and government funding in different ways. The results they yield, however, are strikingly consistent.
ANALYSIS GOVERNMENT FUNDING AND POLITICAL ACTIVITY AMONG CONGREGATIONS
SAMPLE. This analysis uses data from the National Congregations Study (NCS), a survey of a nationally representative sample of religious congregations in the United States. The NCS gathered data via a 60-minute interview with one key informant-a minister, priest, rabbi, or other leader-from 1,236 congregations. The cooperation rate was 85 percent; the response rate was 80 percent.
The probability that a congregation appears in this sample is proportional to its size. Because congregations entered the sample by being named by respondents to the 1998 General Social Survey (GSS) who attend religious services, larger congregations are more likely to appear in the sample than are smaller congregations. Some congregations were nominated by more than one GSS respondent. Weighted only to account for duplicate nominations, univariate statistics from the NCS describe the characteristics of congregations in terms of the numbers of religious service attendees who attend congregations with those characteristics. In this case each attendee is given equal weight. When the data are weighted inversely proportional to congregation size, however, each congregation is given equal weight, regardless of its size, and univariate statistics describe the characteristics of congregations as establishments. Both kinds of numbers are substantively interesting, and we report descriptive statistics from both the individual and congregation perspectives.10 DEPENDENT VARIABLES. The NCS contains data on eight types of political activity: (1) whether people at worship services have been told, within the past 12 months, of opportunities for political activity, including petitioning campaigns, lobbying, or demonstrating; (2) whether voter guides have ever been distributed to people through the congregation; (3) whether the congregation had a group, meeting, class, or event, within the past 12 months, to organize or participate in a demonstration or march to support or oppose a public issue or policy, (4) to register people to vote, (5) to discuss politics, or (6) to organize or participate in efforts to lobby elected officials of any sort; and whether, within the past 12 months, (7) an elected official or (8) anyone running for office spoke to the congregation. All of these variables are dichotomously coded.
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES. Our key independent variable is whether a congregation received any funds from local, state, or federal government in support of their social service activities." Overall, 3 percent of congregations received government funds in 1998 in support of their social service activities.
As noted earlier, we wish to control for congregations' underlying inclination to engage with the world around them, which would make them more likely both to receive funds from government and to be politically active. In an attempt to directly control for a congregation's underlying tendency to engage with its community, we construct a community involvement measure that is the first factor extracted from a factor analysis of seven variables: (1) the number of social service programs sponsored by the congregation, (2) whether the congregation has planned or conducted an assessment of community needs, (3) whether someone from a social service agency has been a visiting speaker, (4) whether the congregation has held an event to organize or encourage people to do volunteer work, (5) whether an academic or professor has been a visiting speaker, (6) whether an outside group, program, or event has used space in the congregation's building, and (7) whether the congregation has conducted or used a community survey.12 A value of 0 on this measure means that a congregation has an average level of community involvement as reflected by these seven activities; a value of 1 means that its level of community involvement is one standard deviation above the average. We also control for a variety of other congregational characteristics related to congregations' inclination to seek government money and be politically active. These categories, based on denominational affiliation, do not exhaust the religious differences associated with congregations' underlying tendency to engage the world around them. Another indicator of religious culture that crosscuts these religious traditions is a congregation's theological orientation, measured by the following item: "Theologically speaking, would your congregation be considered more on the conservative side, more on the liberal side, or right in the middle?" Although much of the liberal/conservative variation among congregations is represented by differences in denomination-based religious traditions, there also is substantial theological variation within denominations. This variation, over and above denominational affiliation, is associated with a congregation's likelihood of being civically engaged: Self-described liberal congregations are more engaged than are self-described conservative congregations, whatever their denominations. We therefore include as controls two dummy variables based on this item.
We also know from previous research that predominantly African American congregations are more likely than are predominantly white congregations to be engaged in certain key kinds of political activities, and they also are more likely to be open to government collaboration and funding (Beyerlein and Chaves 2003; Chaves 1999). We therefore include a control for a congregation's racial composition: a dichotomous variable coded 1 for all congregations in which at least 80 percent of the regular participants are African American.
Congregations are aggregations of individuals as well as more or less formally constituted organizations. Since it is likely that congregations' activities largely reflect the preferences and activities of the people in them, it is important to control variables known to be associated with more civically engaged individuals. Relevant variables include the percent of a congregation's people with four-year college or higher degrees (logged), with household incomes over $100,000 in 1998 (logged), who are under age 35 (logged), and who are over age 60 (logged). We also include dummy variables indicating location in the south or in a city.
Finally, congregations with more organizational capacity are more likely both to seek government funding and be politically active, so we include controls indicating several aspects of organizational capacity: size (logged number of regular participants), founding date, and whether the head clergyperson has at least a four-year college degree.
ANALYSIS STRATEGY. We estimate eight logistic regressions. Each model uses all cases with nonmissing data on the dependent variable. When there are missing data on independent variables, mean values (in the case of continuous variables) or zeros (in the case of dummy variables) are substituted. Missing value indicators are then included in each model to confirm that this strategy does not affect the substantive results.14
The logistic regressions use nonweighted data, and we used diagnostic tests recommended by Winship and Radbill (1994) to look for misspecification error related to the probability-proportional-to-size feature of the sample. These tests indicated that, although interaction terms involving size should be included in several of our models, the coefficients attached to the government-funding variable are never substantively altered by including these interactions. Including all of these terms would unnecessarily complicate the presentation of our results, so we leave them out. ing the data only to account for duplicate nominations of congregations); the second two columns present the comparison for religious congregations as organizational units without respect to size (that is, applying a weight that undoes the probability-proportional-to-size nature of the sample). The picture is clear. On all eight items, people in congregations that receive government funds are significantly more likely than are people in congregations without such funding to be from congregations that also engage in that kind of political activity. In every case the difference is sizeable and statistically significant. The table's bottom line tells the basic story. Eighty-six percent of people in congregations with government funds are from congregations that engaged in at least one of these political activities, compared with only 60 percent of people in congregations without government funds.
The picture does not change much when we look at congregations as organizational units without respect to size. Here, 59 percent of congregations with government funds have engaged in at least one of these political activities, compared with only 41 percent of congregations without government funds. The bivariate difference remains substantial for 5 of the 8 items.15 Overall, congregations with government funding appear to be more engaged in politics than do congregations without such funding.
This basic pattern is sustained by the multivariate results reported in Table 2 . There is much that is interesting in this table, but the primary results, and the ones relevant for our argument, appear in the first row. Receiving government funding for social service activity 1980, 1983, 1984, 1987, 1988, 1991, 1992, 1993, and 1994 . Grants and contracts were included, but reimbursements for Medicaid or Medicare were not. The amounts received were converted into 1994 dollars, and two-year averages were calculated to smooth year-to-year fluctuations. Thus we have data on the amount of money each organization received from four different government sources for five two-year 16 Including the community involvement scale in the models reduces the magnitude of the government funding coefficient, on average, by 25 percent. 17 The mean of this political activity scale is .831 We use these data to construct three measures of government support: a dummy variable indicating if the organization received any public money, a continuous variable indicating the percent of an organization's budget coming from government sources, and a continuous variable indicating the absolute dollar amount received from government sources.18
As in the congregational analysis, it is important to control for variation in nonprofits' underlying inclination to engage with the state. For 1984 and 1988, we construct a community involvement scale from items asking about major public or community relations efforts directed at the general public, community leaders, non-government funders, or the local media. Each of these targets was asked about separately, and the scale simply sums (range = 0 to 4) the number of targets at which efforts were directed.19 Furthermore, we exploit the longitudinal nature of these data by controlling whether the organization lobbied (or directed public relations efforts at government targets) in the previous observation period.
We also control for other characteristics related to an organization's inclination to seek government money and be politically active. Most important, we include two measures of organizational capacity: size (dollar expenditures in millions) and age.
The organizations in this data set operate in a wide range of functional arenas, and they serve different populations. It seems likely that the connection between government funding and political activity would work differently in different subsectors of the nonprofit sector. Health and welfare organizations, for example, 18 Analyses using a set of dummy variables distinguishing receipt of funds from federal, state, county, and city sources yield results substantively similar to those reported below.
19 The mean of this community involvement scale are more likely than cultural organizations both to receive government funding and be politically active. And organizations serving clients or the general public are more likely than organizations serving members both to receive government funding and be politically active. Member-oriented organizations tend to be more insular. To ensure that our results are not an artifact of the mix of arenas and beneficiaries represented in this particular data set, we use two sets of dummy variable controls. One set represents seven activity areas: health and welfare, education, legal services, recreation, culture, science, and housing and urban development. Respondents were asked to rank these activity areas in terms of organizational priorities; our dummy variables are coded 1 if an organization named that arena as "most important" to them. Many organizations gave a rank of 1 to more than one area, indicating that more than one area was "most important." Consequently, these seven items are not mutually exclusive, so there is no reference category. We have these data for all time periods.
Respondents also were asked "who benefits from the activities of your organization." Responses were coded into four categories: members, clients/patients/students, the public, and other/mixed.20 We represent this information with three dummy variables, using member-serving organizations as the reference category. Table 3 presents the bivariate relationship between government funding and lobbying activity by comparing, in each interval, the organizations receiving government funds with the organizations receiving no such funds. Both for organizations that received government funding and for those that did not at time 1, we show the percentage of organizations that lobbied between time 1 and time 2. It is clear that, except for the 1988-1992 interval, organizations that had public money were significantly and substantively more likely to engage in lobbying activity than those that did not have public support. The relationship is in the same direction for the 1988-1992 interval, but the magnitude of the difference is smaller and does not reach statistical significance. Table 4 presents a series of logistic regressions in which the dependent variables are the dichotomous measures of lobbying in the years prior to 1984, 1988, 1992, and 1994. With one exception, all predictor variables were lagged four years in the first three sets of results and two years in the last set of results. The exception is the community involvement scale, which was not measured after 1988. For each time period, we estimated three models: one in which the key independent variable is a dummy variable representing the presence or absence of government funding in the previous period, one in which the key independent variable is the percentage of revenue coming from government sources in the previous period, and one in which the key independent variable is the absolute dollar amount (in millions) coming from government in the previous period. We emphasize 20 In some years this question was open-ended; in other years respondents were given specific response categories. that these models include controls both for a general tendency towards community involvement and (except for model 1) whether the organization lobbied in the previous period.21
RESULTS.
As in the congregational analysis, there is much interesting detail in this table, but we limit our attention to the findings ( (table available upon request) do not paint a clear picture about whether nonprofit political activity is an effective tactic for increasing government funding. In only 5 of the 24 equations did we find a significant (at the p < .05 level) positive effect of lobbying on increases in a public funding stream, 1 coefficient was significantly negative, and the rest were null. These results add to our confidence that the positive effects of government funding reported in Table 4 are not wholly produced by a reversed causal order in which organizational lobbying generates government funding for nonprofits, but there is a hint of reverse causation that future research might profitably explore.
LIMITATIONS OF THE TWO ANALYSES
We find that government funding does not suppress nonprofit political activity in either the Minneapolis-St. Paul sample or the congregations sample. Perhaps, however, we fail to find evidence for suppression of this activity because of limitations on our data and analysis. We consider five potentially relevant limitations.
First, we measure only some types of political activity-eight types of political activity for congregations and two for noncongregational nonprofits. It remains possible that government funding suppresses political activities other than the specific ones we measure. A second limitation is related: We do not know the content of any of this political activity, and so we are not able to assess the extent to which nonprofit political advocacy is narrowly self-interested versus broadly public-spirited. Perhaps if we were able to distinguish self-interested from public-spirited activity we would find that government funding generally suppresses the latter but not the former.
Although we measure only some types of political activity, and although it remains possible that we have missed a type of political activity that is suppressed by government funding, our measures cover a range of activitiesfrom lobbying to organizing demonstrations and marches to sponsoring speeches by candidates-and the consistency of our results across all of these activities provides some confidence that the patterns we observe here are not specific to any particular kind of political activity. Relatedly, although we have no direct knowledge about the specific content of any of this political activity, the results are no different for activities, like organizing demonstrations or marches, that seem more likely to be public-spirited than self-interested. Moreover, the distinction between public-spirited and self-interested action in the nonprofit arena can be difficult to draw. If a nonprofit's political activity increases the funding stream flowing to that organization, but that increased funding also means that more meals are served, more beds are provided, more job-training classes are held, and so on, it is not clear that such political activity should be considered self-serving rather than publicspirited. From this perspective, our lack of knowledge about the content of these organizations' political activity seems less limiting for our argument than it otherwise might. A third limitation is that, with the exception of one ordinal scale, we measure only the presence or absence of each political activity, not the extent of it. It remains possible that government funding reduces the intensity with which nonprofits engage in political activity without reducing the likelihood that they do it at all. However, if government funding in fact generally suppressed the intensity with which organizations engaged in politics, it presumably would reduce some levels of intensity to zero, and this should have left a trace in our dichotomous measures.
Fourth, we have presented results only on linear relationships between the percentage of a nonprofit's revenue that comes from government and the likelihood that the nonprofit pursues political activity. But perhaps the effect of government funding on nonprofit political activity becomes decreasingly positive (but never negative) as organizational dependence on that funding source increases; or perhaps the effect of government funding on political activity actually becomes negative at high levels of organizational dependence. We looked for these nuances by including in our models either a logarithmic transformation of the percentage-ofrevenue variable or its square, but we did not find consistent evidence for any sort of curvilinearity in the relationship between the percentage of an organization's revenue that comes from government and its level of political activity. This may be because we do not have enough organizations in either data set at high enough levels of dependence on government funds to discern curvilinearity.22 But even if curvilinearity exists when government funding levels are extraordinarily high, our results show that at levels of reliance on government funding characterizing the vast majority of congregations and noncongregational nonprofits, government funding does not suppress political activity.
Fifth, we have data on noncongregational nonprofits only from one metropolitan area.
Although we would not claim that the Twin Cities are representative of American cities, and although there is substantial variation across cities in the structure of the nonprofit sector, we do not see any reason to suppose that the key relationships we examine here are peculiar to the Twin Cities. Moreover, our argument does not rest on the Twin Cities data alone. We rest our argument on the consistency of results from these two very different data sets, and across several different political activities, nonprofit subsectors, and types of government entity from which nonprofits receive financial support. In light of this consistency we are less concerned than we might otherwise be about limitations applying to either of these data sets if taken alone.23
CONCLUSION
We have engaged the complex theme of the nature and consequences of civil society's autonomy from the state by examining one sector of civil society (nonprofit organizations), one sort of dependence on government (financial), and one kind of consequence (political activity). We described mechanisms by which government funding might suppress nonprofit political activity, and we described other mechanisms by which public funding might enhance that activity. Our results suggest either that these competing mechanisms balance each other or that the mechanisms by which public funding enhances political activity are somewhat stronger. Some observers believe that the resource dependence and legal ambiguities that come with government funding decrease nonprofit political activity, but government-funded nonprofits also have incentives to be politically active-incentives that, as we noted earlier, encompass both self-interest and public spiritedness in ways difficult to disentangle. Add to these incentives government's dependency on nonprofits to deliver services, and also add other dynamics we have not elaborated, such as 22 In the congregations data, only 7 congregations received more than 10 percent of their income from government, and no congregation in this sample received more than 27 percent of its annual income from that source. In the Twin Cities data, only between 15 and 20 percent of organizations in each period received more than two thirds of their income from government. 23 We referred earlier to the 2000 survey of a national sample of nonprofits large enough to file financial information with the IRS. This survey also found a null relationship between the percentage of an organization's budget coming from government and the extent to which it lobbies government officials (Berry 2003:90 ). government's need for nonprofit expertise when it comes to formulating policy, and the result is a set of forces that seems at least to balance the resource dependencies, legal ambiguities, and other factors that push in the opposite direction. There is much to be said for "following the money" and attending to the power inequities produced by resource dependence. Nothing in this study contradicts the sociological wisdom that, all else equal, resource dependence reduces the capacity for autonomous action. But all else is not equal. When a nonprofit organization receives government funding, forces other than resource dependence are set in motion, and in the presence of such forces, resource dependence does not necessarily produce political quiescence. In this arena it appears to be a mistake to infer loss of autonomy from resource dependence.
Whatever the detailed operations of the mechanisms set in motion by government funding, these mechanisms net out to either a positive or a null effect on political activity. We are tempted to conclude that government funding in fact enhances nonprofits' political activity, but a more cautious interpretation of our results is that government funding does not suppress it. Yet even this more cautious interpretation implies that the nonprofit sector remains a viable vehicle of citizen advocacy, even in the presence of its increasing reliance on government funds to carry out its core work. At least in the specific manifestation we have examined, civil society's capacity for political action does not seem to be reduced by its increased reliance on government funding.
Our conclusion is not affected by our exclusive focus on nonprofits whose primary purpose is something other than politics-on 501(c)(3) rather than 501(c)(4) organizations. By focusing on 501(c)(3) organizations we surely have understated the extent to which nonprofits engage in political activity, but we do not see any reason that this focus should undermine our primary conclusion about the effect of government funding on nonprofit political activity. Indeed, it seems reasonable to conjecture that, if government funding does not reduce political activity among organizations for which politics is a secondary activity, neither is it likely to reduce political activity in organizations for which advocacy is the top priority. Establishing the truth of this conjecture, however, is a task for future research.
Whatever the broadly theoretical import of our results, our congregations' results speak directly to ongoing debate concerning "charitable choice" or "faith-based" initiatives intended to direct more public funds supporting social services to religious organizations, including religious congregations. Critics of these initiatives, from both the political right and left, have expressed concern that increased government funding might threaten the mission and distinctiveness of religious organizations. Critics from the right worry that government funding might threaten what some believe to be a distinctively "holistic" approach to social services manifest in religious organizations that maintain their autonomy from government.24 Critics from the left worry that congregations and other religious organizations might lose their "prophetic voice"-their capacity to engage in political activity critical of government-if they receive government funds to support their social service activities. Our results suggest that the latter criticism is largely unwarranted.
Our evidence suggests that putting more government money into the "black box" of Figure  1 does not reduce the amount of political activity coming out of the box, but we have offered only limited insight into the inner workings of that box. Given the rudimentary state of knowledge about the relationship between government funding and nonprofit political activity, the step we take here is a necessary early step in the effort to develop systematic knowledge about this relationship. Future research should move beyond our analysis to examine the relative importance of the various mechanisms by which government funding influences nonprofit political activity, the possibility that the relative importance of those mechanisms shifts at different levels of nonprofit dependence on government or for different types of nonprofits, and the possibility that the system changes over 
